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GIG WORKERS: WALKING A TIGHTROPE WITHOUT A
SAFETY NET
By Joshua M. Javits1 and Matthew L. Luby23*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Annually every spring—until the COVID-19 pandemic which began in March 2020,
professional sports teams turn to their own budding prospects. Rookie drafts garner media
attention and propel the possibility of staggering salaries into the headlines.3 Undrafted free
agents, for their part, begin searching for jobs.
With a lesser celebrity profile, many American workers have themselves become
free agents in an economy transformed by technology. The static newspaper classified ads of
the past have been joined by vast online platforms, such as TaskRabbit and Freelancer.com,
that allow jobseekers to connect with individuals seeking a diverse range of services—from
graphic design and data entry to home furniture assembly.4 Yet, this flexibility comes with a
flipside, potentially placing workers on a path to economic insecurity and at the crossroads of
a complicated legal debate about what rights and benefits they are due.
A. The Growth of Gig Workers
Although precise numbers and definitions are elusive, roughly 15.8% of U.S.
workers are engaged in alternative work arrangements.5 Economics plays a part in the
popularity of freelancing and contracting, as full-time opportunities remain out of reach for
many workers or are insufficient to meet basic needs if they are even available.6 A desire for
work-life balance drives others to pursue a flexible work arrangement.7 Moreover, there are
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real work benefits to gig workers of being independent contractors -- e.g., flexibility,
independence, and being within limits able to make more by working more to make more.
The COVID-19 pandemic—with its stay-at-home orders and the consequent
economic dislocation—together with worker’s personal predilections have undoubtedly
accelerated the movement toward dispersed and project-based employment. The pandemic
has given an enormous push to the already existing trend away from traditional employment
attributes such as office work and regular work hours. Businesses are seeing the potential for
huge cost savings by reducing office space and other overhead. Workers are attracted by
work-at-home scenarios that eliminate commuting, reduce child-care costs, and result in less
expensive housing because of the ability to live further away from city or even suburban
workplaces.8
The impact of this trend away from the workplace is the loss of connections among
employees. However, the trend towards a fragmented workforce may have its limits for
businesses themselves as common corporate goals, cohesiveness, and culture are jeopardized.
In addition to this, the loss of employee connections may create greater obstacles to pursuing
collective activities, such as union organizing or even more informal pursuit of shared safety
or scheduling concerns.
B. The Legal Regime
The extent to which this economic and cultural movement away from traditional
employment grows depends on the legal structure of the employer-employee relationship.
Federal labor law distinguishes between two categories of workers: employees and
independent contractors. Employees can access multiple benefits and protections, including
collective bargaining rights, health insurance, medical leave, workers’ compensation, and
retirement plans. Independent contractors cannot access these same benefits and protections
by operation of law. Absent these supports, independent contractors take on the risk of
gravely unpredictable life circumstances in an uncertain economy.
As will be discussed, recent interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act and
the Fair Labor Standards Act by government agencies have broadened the definition of
independent contractor and denied worker employment rights. In California, the passage of
what is known as Proposition 22 will make it significantly tougher to reclassify gig workers
involved in the rideshare industry as employees. As a result it will be harder to achieve
workplace protections such as base pay, workers compensation, and meaningful health
insurance coverage, particularly if this approach is adopted in other states under pressure from
Uber and Lyft.
C. Individual versus Collective Protections in the Sports and Entertainment Industries
The fluid relationship between individuals and their work in today’s economy
creates opportunities to clarify relationships through negotiation and creative problem solving
to ensure everyone’s needs are met. Importantly, though “gig” workers such as actors and
professional athletes earn their living in ways distinct from the office and factory work on
8

Gil Press, The Future of Work Post-Covid-19, FORBES (July 15, 2020, 9:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2020/07/15/the-future-of-work-post-covid-19/?sh=2c48bc884baf.
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which current labor law is based, they share with all workers a common desire for financial
security and well-being.9 The entertainment and professional sports industries boast decades
of experience navigating the risks and rewards of nontraditional working settings and
arrangements. Sports and entertainment employment relationships are a unique balance of
flexible individual and protective collective concerns. These industries may offer tools and
strategies that can be used with flexibility to develop contracts, policies, and practices for the
gig workers of today and the future.
Similarly, professional associations, such as those of pilots and nurses, bring
together professionals who share common concerns. Many of these associations have
developed into unions but, at the same time, have retained their focus on occupational and
public policy issues. Viewed through this lens, the diverse relationships typical of today’s
flexible workforce may inform the creation of an inclusive, rather than exclusive, national
labor policy. Such a policy should recognize the benefits to the economy of flexible
employment relationships while promoting fairness and economic security for all who work.
The combination of collective and individual negotiation, which has emerged in the
sports and entertainment industry, is premised on the bargaining power of individuals with
unique and valuable talents, as well as the understanding that their bargaining power can
erode substantially over time. This model may apply imperfectly to gig workers without
unique talents and whose leverage may be based only on their availability to undertake an
assignment when needed. However, it seems increasingly likely that such workers will
coalesce to improve their conditions, either through political action, application of economic
pressure, and work towards a combination of individual and collective negotiation to protect
their interests. The form this effort takes will depend on how established law is interpreted
and the extent to which new laws are passed to protect their interests. If this occurs, such
workers will occupy a new middle ground - shared with sports and entertainment figures between pure collective bargaining in which individual negotiation is prohibited, and the
purely individual negotiations that occur between genuine independent contractors and their
customers.10
The legal framework for the debate about independent contractors and employee
status is discussed in Part II of this article. The laws and working relationships of the sports
and entertainment industries are discussed in Part III, and the challenges confronting workers
in these sectors are compared with those faced by other nontraditional workers. Tools and
strategies that have been used with success in sports and entertainment and that could be
applied to the U.S. gig economy will be considered later in the article. Part IV examines the
California experience in addressing the independent contractor/employee dichotomy which
has been a highly politicized process. Part V focuses on the potential for the sports and
entertainment industry hybrid model to satisfactorily balance the interests involved.

9

Tee
geoerammy
INDY
WORKER
GUILD,
http://www.indyworkerguild.org/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180401235007/https://indyworkerguild.org/].
10
Tee J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944) (prohibiting individual negotiations when a union is
the certified bargaining agent for employees).
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II.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), chief among the nation’s labor
laws, regulates collective bargaining in the private sector and the relationship between
employers and employees.11
The NLRA does not, however, cover all workers. The law excludes from its
protections several groups, among them public employees, managers and supervisors,
agricultural workers, domestic workers, and- significantly for our purposes- independent
contractors.12 With important workers’ rights in the balance, disputes about employee
classification are common.13 Classification as an employee affords individuals the right to
join a union that will collectively bargain on their behalf. Designation as an independent
contractor makes one ineligible for the NLRA’s protections and offers potential advantages to
employers in the form of reduced expenditures on taxes, wages, benefits, and workers’
compensation insurance.14 The line between covered employees and excluded independent
contractors is increasingly imprecise in the age of nontraditional workplaces and
arrangements.15
This evolution of the workplace has complicated and raised the stakes of the
decades long debate between unions and employers over the status and definition of
independent contractors. Employers embrace the application of independent-contractor status
as an efficient means of cutting payroll costs and responding to fluctuating market needs.16
Unions and advocates, for their part, fear that such classifications are being used to erode
workers’ rights to organize unions; access state workers’ compensation and wage and hour
requirements; and access critical labor and employment laws dealing with wage protection,
economic security, and health and safety. These rights and protections are embodied in the
National Labor Relations Act, the Railway Labor Act (RLA), the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), the Mine
Safety and Health Act (MSHA), the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and Social Security.17
Identifying workers as independent contractors reduces employer costs and gives
them a competitive advantage. The former Acting Secretary of Labor Seth Harris noted a
compelling economic reason for employers to classify workers as independent contractors:

11

See generally WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 27 (Cambridge Univ. Press,
4th ed. 2004).
12
Jurisdictional Standards, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/the-law/jurisdictionalstandards (last visited Mar. 10, 2022).
13
Jennifer Pinsof, A New Take on an Old Problem: Employee Misclassification in the Modern Gig-Economy,
22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 341, 343 (2016).
14
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-656, EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS: IMPROVED OUTREACH
COULD HELP ENSURE PROPER WORKER CLASSIFICATION 25 (2006).
15
See id.
16
Sarah Leberstein & Catherine Ruckelshaus, Independent Contractor vs. Employee: Why independent
contractor misclassification matters and what we can do to stop it, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (May 2016),
https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/Policy-Brief-Independent-Contractor-vs-Employee.pdf.
17
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169, 203, 651–678, 1001–1461; 30 U.S.C. §§ 801– 966; 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188.
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[E]mployees bring meaningfully higher labor costs than independent
contractors…18industries where labor represents a substantial share of
production costs and competitive bidding for contracts is common, the cost
differential between employees and independent contractors can be the
difference between winning or losing contract…19 newer industries like the
online platform economy, lower labor costs derived from business models
where workers are classified as independent contractors can increase both
profit projections and EBIDTA [Earnings Before Interest, Taxes,
Depreciation, and Amortization]. This savings in labor costs] provides a
valuable competitive edge in capital markets.20
Harris cites one study that has estimated that online platform companies are able to
save labor costs of up to 30% by classifying workers as independent contractors.21
The economic consequences of the distinction between independent contractor and
employee status for both employers and workers are undoubtedly, the fundamental motive to
repeatedly change the definition of “independent contractor “based on the political and
ideological perspectives of those who hold power. The Obama National Labor Relations
Board narrowed the application of the independent contractor exemption from NLRA
coverage with respect to gig workers in FedEx Home Delivery, Sisters’ Camelot, Christopher
Allison and IWW Sisters’ Camelot Canvassers Union.22 However, the NLRB under the Trump
administration rejected the FedEx Home Delivery and Sisters’ Camelot analysis in
SuperShuttle DFW, Inc. and Amalgamated Transit Union 1338,23 arguing that the Obama
Board had “fundamentally shifted the independent contractor analysis, for implicit, policybased reasons.”24 It restored a more expansive application of independent contractor status in
which a finding of entrepreneurial elements in the rendition of service was enough to take a
worker out of NLRA coverage. While SuperShuttle DFW is the prevailing precedent on the
factors which define a worker as an independent contractor, it is quite possible, and perhaps
likely, that the approach to the independent contractor exemption articulated in FedEx Home
Delivery and Sisters Camelot will be revived when Biden appointees become a Board
majority, thereby extending the debate until a legislative solution is imposed.
Finding such a solution is, of course, easier said than done. States which have
developed legislation to protect employment status have run into the same ideological and
political divisions that are exhibited in the application of the NLRA. In 2019, California
enacted AB-5, which applied a presumption in favor of employment status and a simplified
18

Seth D. Harris, Workers, Protections, and Benefits in the U.S. Gig Economy, GLOB. L. REV. 1, 1 (Sept.
2018).
19
Id. at 13 n. 39 (citing a GAO study “collecting studies of construction industry miscalculation.”).
20
EBITDA is one measure of net income and, therefore, of a company’s financial performance that is
sometimes used to determine the valuation of companies that are not publicly traded. Id. at 13 n. 40.
21
Id. at 13 (citing Karla Walker & Kate Bahn, Raising Pay and Providing Benefits for Workers in a Disruptive
Economy,
CTR.
FOR
A M.
PROGRESS
(Oct.
13,
2017),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2017/10/13/440483/raising-payprovId.ing-benefitsworkers-disruptive-economy/).
22
See FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B 610 (2014); Sisters’ Camelot, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 13, at 2 (Sept. 25,
2015).
23
Super Shuttle, 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, at 13 (2019).
24
Id. at 11.
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three-part test to establish independent contractor status.25 This criterion was validated in
court with respect to rideshare drivers.26 However, as discussed, infra, during the 2020
election, California voters approved Proposition 22, which exempted drivers using App based
on line platforms supplied by firms such as Uber and Lyft to accept driving assignments from
being classified as employees.27 This victory was not easily won. Rideshare companies
invested more than two hundred million dollars in advertising in support of passage and
committed to provide certain new protections for their drivers such as a wage floor and
provision of a benefits fund (while continuing to exempt them from workers compensation
coverage and eligibility for collective bargaining), an investment which underscores the
economic significance of the distinction between employee and independent contractor.28 Not
surprisingly, the passage of the proposition did not end the controversy – unions have pursued
litigation arguing that depriving gig workers of workers compensation coverage and
collective bargaining rights violates the California state constitution.29
As nontraditional work arrangements emerge, the relationships between allies and
adversaries are changing too. Traditional opponents of regulation of the employment
relationship are expressing concern over the long term ramifications of substitution of
employment by independent contractor or “gig” status, particularly with respect to
maintaining an accessible pool of qualified workers in an era where labor shortages are
increasingly commonplace.30 The existence of a vast flexible workforce with very limited
workplace protection poses potentially troubling consequences for the economic security of
25

Assemb.
B.
5,
2019–2020
Leg.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Cal.
2019),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB5. The Act was based on the
decision of the California Supreme Court in Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v Super. Ct. of L.A., 4 Cal 5th 903,
963 (2018).
26
See People v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. CGC-20-584402, 2020 WL 5440308, at *1 (Cal. Super. Aug. 10, 2020)
(Order on People’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Related Motions), aff’d, People v. Uber Tech., et al.,
56 Cal. App. 5th 266 (2020).
27
Proposition 22, App-Based Drivers as Contractors and Labor Policy Initiative. (Cal. 2020).
28
Suhauna Hussain et al., How Uber and Lyft Persuaded California to Vote Their Way, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 13,
2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2020-11-13/how-uber-lyft-doordashwon-proposition-22/. On February 3, 2021, the California Supreme Court declined to hear an emergency appeal
brought by drivers and the Service Employees International Union that the proposition violated the California
state constitution, although the decision was without prejudice to pursuit of the case in a lower court.
Castellanos
v.
State,
S266551
(Feb.
3,
2021),
https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/disposition.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=2338840&doc_no=S26655
1&request_token=NiIwLSEmPkw8W1BVSSFdSE9JQFQ0UDxTJSM%2BUz9TICAgCg%3D%3D.
29
Kate Conger, California’s Gig Worker Law Is Unconstitutional, Judge Rules, N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/20/technology/prop-22-california-ruling.html.

30

Lydia DePillis, Tech Companies, Labor Advocates, and Think Tankers of All Stripes Call for Sweeping
Reforms
to
the
Social
Safety
Net,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
12,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/12/tech-companies-labor-advocates-and-thinktankers-of-all-stripes-call-for-sweeping-reforms-to-the-social-safety-net/ (highlighting the strange bedfellows
story of unions and free market advocates working collaboratively to address the insecurity of independent
contractors). See also Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & The Future of Employment and Labor Law, 51 U.S.F. L.
REV. 51, 53 (2017)(“‘The move to insecure, irregular jobs represents the most profound economic change of
the past four decades.’”) (quoting Robert Kuttner, The Task Rabbit Economy, THE AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 10,
2013), https://prospect.org/power/task-rabbit-economy/).
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U.S. workers since they would not enjoy the legal and economic protections noted above—a
reality that demands collaborative solutions from workers, employers, and advocates.31
Individuals who have a unique skill may have leverage, but those without
specialized skills or talents have little left in today’s economy. Traditionally, joining together
in a union provided workers with fewer unique skills with greater bargaining power in
negotiations with companies over wages hours and working conditions. However, absent
traditional union vehicles, individuals with relatively little power to obtain or retain work
because they lack highly marketable talents also lack bargaining power to acquire decent
compensation, benefits, or work rules.
The question of how to protect the gig worker is arising in the context of the
diminishing presence of unions as a representative of private sector employees.32 Not
coincidentally, the gap between the pay of hourly workers and executives has dramatically
increased during the past 40 years as union penetration has ebbed.33 Many reasons help
explain these developments, including automation of industrial work that at one time paid
well and multinational operations that allow for movement of production work overseas. The
diminution of the unionized sector and collective bargaining and is clearly a factor. The
increasing imbalance of the return to capital as opposed to labor is not tenable over the long
term in an economy that heavily depends on consumer consumption. The question is whether
traditional organizing and collective bargaining are adequate to deal with the specific
problems of workers in the gig economy and the general problem of growing inequality of
wealth and resources. Beyond the absence of a “safety net” for independent contractors, the
accelerating economic divide and shrinking middle class will have adverse consequences for
America’s consumer-based economy.34

31
Lobel, supra note 30, at 73. (“The future of employment and labor law depends on policymakers responding
to the ongoing changes in the job market, technology advances, and shifting economic realities.”).
32
Union Members Summary, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., (Jan. 19, 2018, 10:00 AM),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180906051405/https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm].
In light of the recent election successes of Amazon and Starbucks workers, labor has expressed a new optimism
and impetus towards organizing workers in the new economy. https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2022-0523/starbucks-amazon-apple-union-campaigns-history.
33
In 1965 the ratio of executive to worker pay was 20:1, in 1978 the ratio increased to 30:1, by 1989 it
increased to 58:1, and by 2000 it was 368:1. The bottom line is that CEO compensation has grown 940% since
the first increase in the ratio in 1978, while compensation of hourly workers has risen only 12% in the same
time frame. Lawrence Mishel & Julia Wolfe, CEO Compensation Has Grown 940% Since 1978, ECON. POL’Y
INST. (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-compensation-2018/. Since 1983 the number of
union members has declined by 2.9 million, dropping the rate of union membership from 20.1% of the overall
workforce in 1983 to 11.1% in 2015. Megan Dunn & James Walker, Spotlight on Statistics: Union
Membership in the United States, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. 1, 2 (Sept. 2016),
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2016/union-membership-in-the-united-states/pdf/union-membership-in-theunited-states.pdf. Additionally, private-sector unionization has declined from 16.8% in 1983 to 6.7% in 2015.
The inference that the decline in private-sector union membership has run parallel to the rising wage gap
between CEOs and ordinary workers is not hard to justify. Lawrence Mishel et al., Explaining the Erosion of
Private-Sector
Unions,
ECON.
POL’Y
INSTITUTE
(Nov.
18,
2020),
https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/publications/private-sector-unions-corporate-legal-erosion/.
34
Alison Taylor, COVID-19 Has Ushered in the Age of the ‘Intangible Company’. Here Are 4 Ways It Will
Change Business, WORLD ECON. F. (June 16, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/06/covid-19intangible-company-leadership-remote-working/.
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The traditional focus on employees as beneficiaries in economic relief packages was
upended in the Covid recent relief laws passed by Congress, which put gig workers on an
equal footing with employees. The economic impact of excluding them from any level of
protection was acknowledged in the economic stimulus package known as the CARES
[Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act] which afforded gig workers certain
new, but temporary, protections. The Pandemic Unemployment Assistance Program (PUA)
extended unemployment benefit assistance to independent contractors who have lost work
due to the COVID-19 pandemic and provided gig workers with as much as $600 per week in
unemployment insurance through July 2020.35 Despite the ambiguity of the legal status of gig
workers the program extended them rights to unemployment insurance even though it did not
classify them as employees. Gig workers were given a small piece of the social safety net, but
only when the federal government subsidized the assistance.36
In sum, despite a developing consensus that gig workers have special problems and
vulnerabilities that should be addressed, there is still significant resistance to fashioning
solutions which provide this category of workers with meaningful rights and a voice in the
workplace. However, the sports and entertainment industries constitute a model for
combining individual and collective negotiation in a way which may point towards a better
system with more security for this highly vulnerable classification.

35
The CARES Act defines 11 different categories of individuals who qualify for benefits under the Pandemic
Unemployment Assistance (PUA), including if “the individual meets any additional criteria established by the
Secretary for unemployment assistance under this section . .” Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
Act Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 2102(a)(3)(A)(ii)(I), 134 Stat. 281, 313-14 (2020); The Secretary of Labor has
issued guidance stating that “an individual who works as an independent contractor with reportable income
may also qualify for PUA benefits if he or she is unemployed, partially employed, or unable or unavailable to
work because the COVID-19 public health emergency has severely limited his or her ability to continue
performing his or her customary work activities, and has thereby forced the individual to suspend such
activities.” Pandemic Unemployment Assistance Implementation and Operating Instructions, Attachment I to
UIPL No. 16-20, pp. 1–6.
36
Similar issues have emerged at Silicon Valley giant Google, and its parent company Alphabet, where a
group of more than 400 engineers and other white-collar employees and contractors have formed what has
become known as the Alphabet Workers Union (AWU) with the help of the Communications Workers of
America (CWA). However, the AWU is different than a traditional union which is certified under the NLRA to
seek and enforce a collective bargaining agreement with standard workplace protections and benefits. Instead,
the AWU is a minority union whose membership comprises only a fraction of the company’s more than
260,000 full time employees. Employees who organized the union said that its formation was part of a larger
effort to give structure and longevity to activism at Google as opposed to a platform to negotiate for a collective
bargaining agreement. The focus is on issues such as pay discrimination, diversity, and sexual harassment. It
is not clear how much of an impact the formation of such an organization will have on the workplace at a
company such as Google or in Silicon Valley as a whole, which has long been resistant to unionization in any
form, has insisted on individual dealing with its employees and contractors, and will be under no legal
obligation to negotiate with an organization that has not been elected to represent its workers. The
organization’s leverage will have to be based on its ability to provide a persuasive voice for Silicon Valley
workers, thereby bringing public relations and political pressure on the Company to deal with collective
concerns. Kate Conger, Hundreds of Google Employees Unionize, Culminating Years of Activism, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/04/technology/google-employees-union.html.
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III. LABOR RELATIONS IN THE SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES
For many decades, two industries have reflected the tandem individual and group
nature of workers’ relationships with providers of work: the sports industry and the
entertainment industry. Both industries are heavily unionized with comprehensive collective
bargaining agreements, but they also allow represented workers to enter into their own
individual agreements using the leverage created by their individual talents. These longestablished arrangements combining collective and individual bargaining may shed light on
opportunities for new forms of worker status and collective activity.
A.

Collective Bargaining in Professional Sports

The labor relations of all the major professional sports fall within the purview of the
NLRA.37 In accordance with Section 7, players may select an exclusive bargaining agent to
negotiate on their behalf.38 The major sports engage in a bargaining variation known as
“multi-employer collective bargaining.”39 In this model, team owners bargain collectively as a
single unit (the league) to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a players
association. The CBA typically sets a salary floor and ceiling for all players and addresses
other benefits and conditions, including health care and retirement benefits, travel expenses,
seasons, and schedules.40 These provisions include a Uniform Player Contract establishing
basic and common requirements for all players that enable fair treatment of players across
teams and the ongoing viability of the league.41 In addition to reducing uneven competition
between teams on the basis of compensation and work rules, uniform contracts also reduce
the number of subjects players individually negotiate, such as health insurance.
Although antitrust law prohibits combinations and restraints on competition, explicit
statutory exceptions have been carved out for collective activity by unions in the exercise of
their rights under the NLRA.42 Restraints on competition agreed to as part of collective
bargaining agreements between owners and players associations are likewise immune from
antitrust enforcement based on the non-statutory labor exemption.43 The exemption applies to
collective bargaining terms reached through arms-length bargaining on mandatory subjects,
37

WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., SPORTS LAW IN A NUTSHELL, 70–71 (2017).
29 U.S.C. § 157.
39
Jan Vetter, Commentary on “Multiemployer Bargaining Rules”: Searching for the Right Questions, 75 VA.
L. REV. 285, 286 (1989) (“[M]ultiemployer bargaining exists where there are two or more competing
employers whose employees are represented by the same union.”).
40
See, e.g., NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement (Jan. 19, 2017), https://cosmic-s3.imgix.net/3c7a0a508e11-11e9-875d-3d44e94ae33f-2017-NBA-NBPA-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement.pdf; NFL Collective
Bargaining
Agreement
(Aug.
4,
2011),
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/2011%20CBA%20Updated%20with%20Side%20
Letters%20thru%201-5-15.pdf;
MLB
2017-2021
Basic
Agreement,
https://www.mlbplayers.com/_files/ugd/b0a4c2_95883690627349e0a5203f61b93715b5.pdf.
41
CHAMPION, JR, supra note 37, at 6–7.
42
See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17; 29 U.S.C. § 52; see also Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105,
113.
43
Lacie L. Kaiser, The Flight from Single-Entity Structured Sport Leagues, 2 DePaul J. Sports L. & Contemp.
Probs. 1, 26 (2004); see also Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel
Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 711 (1965).
38
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including “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.”44 Courts have
interpreted the non-statutory exemption broadly to prevent antitrust liability for terms
incorporated by reference in collective bargaining agreements as well as those that appear in
earlier, expired agreements.45
Unique considerations naturally arise based on a player’s experience, success, and
personal needs, and CBAs typically specify which contract provisions and subjects may be
modified through individual bargaining.46 For example, in the National Basketball
Association (NBA), each player must sign the Uniform Player Contract with his team, with
variations generally limited to those related to compensation (within limits) and compensation
protection, bonuses, and promotional appearances.47 Professional players associations have
turned to sports agents to negotiate modifications to the Uniform Player Contract by
individual players because the associations have recognized the ethical and logistical
limitations of individual representation.48 Thus, for example, LeBron James’ record-setting
salary—roughly $100 million over three years49—derives from two distinct bargaining
relationships: between the league and the National Basketball Players Association and
between James’ agent and the team owner.
Depicted with larger-than-life personalities in movies and television, sports agents
occupy a sizeable and controversial role in the day-to-day business of sports.50 With typical
earnings between 2% and 5% of a player’s contracted salary and up to 30% of negotiated
endorsement deals, agents raise the financial stakes of an already lucrative industry.51 For
example, Scott Boras, professional baseball’s top agent, has negotiated an astounding $2.2
billion in contracts, with roughly $132 million in future commissions.52 Lucrative earning
potential has attracted scores to the field, with as many as 1,800 certified agents competing to
represent the 4,300 professional athletes in the four major sports.53
Sports agents play a dynamic role in the collective bargaining process. By focusing
on the needs and strengths of their individual clients, they offer players a measure of
autonomy in a bargaining process that generally prioritizes the collective well- being of
leagues and teams. Additionally, agents may serve as friends, confidantes, financial advisors,
and business managers who help clients navigate offers and opportunities.54

44

29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 36 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Powell v. Nat’l Football League,
930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
46
GOULD IV, supra note 11, at 39.
47
Id. at 40.
48
Id.
49
LeBron James Signs New Multiyear Contract with Cavaliers, ESPN (Aug. 12, 2016),
https://www.espn.in/nba/story/_/id/17287762/lebron-james-signs-cleveland-cavaliers-new-multiyear-contract.
50
Stacey B. Evans, Sports Agents: Ethical Representatives or Overly Aggressive Adversaries, 17 JEFFREY S.
MOORAD SPORTS L. J. 91, 91–93 (2010).
51
Id. at 92.
52
Jason Belzer, The World’s Most Powerful Sports Agents 2016, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2016, 9:46 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbelzer/2016/09/21/the-worlds-most-powerful-sports-agents-2016..
53
James Masteralexis et al., Enough is Enough: The Case for Federal Regulation of Sports Agents, 20 JEFFREY
S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 69, 70 (2013).
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Evans, supra note 50, at 91–92.
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B. Collective Bargaining in the Entertainment Industry
Long before the development of the present-day collective bargaining system in
major league sports, Hollywood guilds developed an NLRA-based representation system
much different than the one that exists for normal hourly workers. This system allowed for
writers and actors to take advantage of their special talents and marketability in individual
bargaining while setting a floor for wages, hours, and benefits applicable to the whole
profession. It also allowed these categories of employees to deal with unique issues such as
creative control and residual use of their work.
Close to two decades ago, in Bargaining: Hollywood Style, Archie Kleingartner
described the basic features of bargaining conducted by guilds and above-the-line unions (i.e.,
unions representing employees with creative functions).55 Those features are:
A schedule of minimum pay rates. The schedule ensures that
members are covered on an egalitarian basis. It provides a floor below
which no employer can pay without special dispensation. Typically, the
only workers paid entirely at the minimum are neophyte or entry workers.
The basis for the minimum is typically time spent on the work or product
delivered, and it varies somewhat among above-the-line unions.
A framework. The framework permits members to negotiate
individual “personal services contracts.” This allows members whose
individual bargaining power exceeds that of the collectively negotiated
minimum to receive individually money payments and other benefits that
exceed what the union has obtained for the membership as a whole.
Residuals or deferred compensation. Residuals are additional
payments to eligible workers for exhibition of an entertainment product in
media other than the one for which it was originally created, or for its
reuse within the same medium.56
Professor Catherine Fisk describes in-depth the collective bargaining history of one
of the major Hollywood guilds, the Writers Guild of America (WGA).57 The bargaining
structure is rooted in producers’ insistence, from the outset of the motion picture industry, on
complete control over what is put forward to the public in their movies and the screenwriter’s
surrender of the copyright to producers. These provisions distinguished Hollywood
screenwriters from Broadway playwrights, where playwrights retain their copyright and
ultimate say over their work but are treated as entrepreneurs or independent contractors rather
than employees.
However, the Hollywood producers wanted it both ways. They wanted full control
over the work and the copyright while at the same time denying that screenwriters were their
employees to avoid being subject to unionization and collective bargaining. The newly

55
56
57

Archie Kleingartner, Collective Bargaining: Hollywood Style, 9 NEW LAB. F. 113, 113 (2001).
Id. at 117–18.
Catherine L. Fisk, Hollywood Writers and the Gig Economy, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177, 178 (2018).
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established NLRB had little trouble finding this position untenable and ruled that
screenwriters were employees covered by the Wagner Act.58
This issue arose again after the predominantly anti-labor provisions of the TaftHartley Act enacted in 1947 excluded independent contractors from NLRA protection.59 At
that time, various ad agencies argued that the writers of their shows were either employees of
their sponsors or independent contractors. The issue was ultimately negotiated rather than
litigated. Initially, the Radio Writers Guild (RWG) proposed “that a writer would be an
employee and covered by the collective bargaining agreement if ‘the company has the right
by contract to require him to perform personal services in making revisions, modifications or
changes,’ and that independent contractors were those who sell or license rights to material
‘without contracting to perform personal services with respect to revision, modification or
change.” The ad agencies would not agree to the proposal, however, because they insisted on
the right to demand revisions from any writer.60
The WGA ultimately secured a far simpler definition of the employees it
represented in radio, film, and television:
In the end, the definition of employee writers covered by all Writers Guild
agreements focused on the employer’s power to require writers to make
revisions to scripts. Employees under the MBA [Minimum Basic
Agreement] are those who “write literary material . . . where the Company
has the right by contract to direct the performances of personal services in
writing or preparing such material or in making revisions, modifications,
or changes therein. . . . It was the power of the employer to force the
writer to make revisions—the right of control—that defined who was an
employee.61
Under the bargaining framework that emerged, the union negotiates a floor for new
writers to be paid a reasonable starting wage and minimum benefits.62 The union also
negotiates matters of collective concern to all writers, such as pension and health care
benefits, through the MBA. However, established writers can bargain additional individual
terms based on recognized skill and success in the industry. Professional agents typically

58

See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 7 N.L.R.B. 662, 688 (1938).
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
60
Fisk, supra, note 57, at 192.
61
Id. at 192–93. Over the years the WGA has secured significant restrictions on the employer’s power to
demand revisions of original work, or to withhold payment based on whether it deems the work acceptable.
Understanding Separated Rights, WRITERS GUILD OF AM. W., https://www.wga.org/contracts/know-yourrights/understanding-separated-rights (last visited Apr. 11, 2022). Likewise, the Guild has bargained to limit the
Company’s power over a writer’s work through control of the copyright. The “separated rights” negotiated by
the Guild and retained by the writer provide him or her with a measure of control the downstream use of work
when, for example, it is published or performed in a different medium (i.e. film converted to a stage play).
Protect Yourself Against Free Rewrites – Know Your Rights, WRITERS GUILD OF AM. W.,
https://www.wga.org/contracts/enforcement/free-rewrite-help (last visited Apr. 11, 2022). In the above
instances the studio’s control over its writers’ output has been eroded as the Guild has negotiated to secure the
creative and economic authority of its members over their work.
62
TV Writer Pay: Losing Ground, WRITERS GUILD AM. W., https://www.wga.org/members/membershipinformation/agency-agreement/tv-writer-pay-losing-ground (last visited Apr. 11, 2022).
59
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perform the individual bargaining, just as occurs in major league sports. The WGA regulates
these negotiations, to a limited degree, through the Artists’ Manager Basic Agreement
(AMBA), a franchise agreement incorporating a code of conduct that talent agencies must
commit to as a condition of representing WGA members. Conversely, WGA members cannot
use talent agencies that are not parties to the AMBA as a condition of membership.63 As a
general matter, if there is a dispute over compliance with an agreement between a writer and a
producer, it is subject to arbitration under the MBA, and the WGA, rather than the agent, will
represent the writer.
At the outset of Wagner Act coverage, the studios argued that collective bargaining
was inappropriate for “creative professionals” such as screenwriters. Nonetheless, the writers
have chosen to maintain this model for four primary reasons:
First, they recognize the importance for all writers of maintaining
solidarity.
Second, even the most powerful and successful feel vulnerable
to studio cost-cutting and to being fired, and they value the collectivelybargained pension and health insurance programs.
Third, they feel that unionization is necessary to preserve writers’
claims to residuals and separated rights, which are all that writers get of the
intellectual property rights in their work.
Fourth, they recognize that studios and networks have the real
power over content, and so they position themselves as labor to maintain a
sense of artistic integrity and autonomy and to distance themselves from
the bad judgments made in corporate suites.64
In short, unionization allows writers to generate the necessary political and
economic clout to deal with an industry that is constantly restructuring. Unionization also
helps ensure that their professionalism and creative power is respected and fairly
compensated in one of the most highly competitive environments in the U.S. economy.65
63

See Writers Guild Am. W., C. Working R. 23 (1986) (Relations between the Guild and the talent agencies
are frequently contentious, and the parties have been in litigation for more than a year over the methodology by
which the agencies extract fees for their services and over the Guild’s alleged attempt to put unlawful economic
pressure on the agencies to modify the AMBA and the fee system); William Morris Endeavor Ent., LLC v.
Writers Guild Am., W., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 3d 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (While the litigation is still pending, the
WGA appears to be reaching modified franchise agreements with the major talent agencies); Wendy Lee &
Anousha Sakoui, UTA drops lawsuit, signs deal with WGA as agency fight thaws, L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2020,
11:51
AM),
https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/business/story/2020-07-14/wga-nears-deal-withunited-talent-agency.
64
Fisk, supra note 57, at 193.
65
The challenges of negotiating contractual minimums on pay and health care while protecting the
entrepreneurial rights of writers were illustrated in the WGA strike against the Alliance of Motion Picture and
Television Producers (AMPTP), which occurred from late 2007 until early 2008. The strike was not over the
traditional fare of collective bargaining—such as pay, hours, and benefits—but rather over issues of control and
financial interest in the use of screenwriters’ work in the future. These issues included the right to residuals
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The below-the-line workers in Hollywood are mostly skilled employees and
technicians, such as sound engineers, electrical technicians, and camera operators. They are
generally treated differently in collective bargaining than above-the-line workers, such as
actors, writers, directors, and producers.
The below-the-line-workers are predominantly represented by the International
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Technicians Artists and Allied
Crafts of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO (IATSE), and must deal with more
standard union challenges such as outsourcing and foreign competition.66 However, even
below the line workers engage in individual bargaining. Higher-end categories, such as
camera operators, set and costume designers, and special effects personnel whose skills are
both scarce and in demand, typically negotiate higher rates than the contractual scale, and
most major talent agencies have departments devoted to below-the-line representation.67 In
some cases, the job category is covered by the contract for all purposes but provides that the
weekly salary is subject to individual negotiations.68 Thus, below-the-line workers receive
collective bargaining benefits such as pension and health benefits, discharge for cause
protections, and other benefits while still exercising individual bargaining clout.
Above-the-line workers who are in strong demand have the leverage to negotiate
lucrative deals as independent contractors. Those who are not as in demand would do better

derived from higher revenues from home video sales and new media (e.g., the internet) as well as more creative
control over reality television and prime time animated television series and studios’ distribution rights.
AMPTP was not willing to acquiesce to many of the Guild’s demands because, in its view, some of them
related to nonbargainable subjects or conflicted with another union’s jurisdiction. Beyond this, the structure of
the industry with the rise of new media was still difficult to foretell. Regarding new media, the WGA’s specific
requests were that writers receive an increase of .30% in the percentage of DVD residuals above what was
current at the time for the first $1 million in sales and .36% for anything sold above that amount, which
amounted to 5 cents for each DVD sale. However, AMPTP disagreed on the grounds DVD sales helped pay for
the rising marketing and production costs of films that fail to perform at the box office; in any case, once more
streaming was available via the internet, DVD sales would inevitably decline. The WGA also requested that the
television minimums be used for internet writing and other digital technologies. The Guild believed the internet
was fast becoming the equivalent of television in terms of the amount of access and viewership, and it wanted
to ensure the writers were on an equal footing. AMPTP balked at this, arguing it was premature to establish a
payment formula for online work given the rapidly changing nature of this medium. The writers began the
strike in November 2007. In January AMPTP reached an agreement on compensation for online work with the
Directors Guild of America (DGA), setting the stage for a similar resolution with the Writers Guild. On
February 12, 2008, the writers approved—by a margin of 92.5%— a new contract that did not improve on the
formula for sharing in DVD receipts but did include compensation for content distributed through the new
media, among other improvements. The WGA’s focus on the new media has been validated by the internet’s
dramatic expansion, which has clearly dwarfed the importance of DVD sales. The fact that the WGA and the
DGA dealt with the issue of new media early in the rapidly expanding streaming platform enabled them to
secure and build on the ability to retain profit from the streaming of their work in the ensuing years.
66
Gail Frommer, Hooray for…Toronto? Hollywood, Collective Bargaining, and Extraterritorial Union Rules
in an Era of Globalization, 6 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 55, 73 (2003).
67
Peter Caranicas, APA Jumps Into the Thick of the Busy Below-the-Line Business, VARIETY (July 29, 2014,
3:55 PM), https://variety.com/2014/artisans/news/apa-gets-into-the-below-the-line-business-1201271182/.
68
Many below-the-line collective bargaining agreements have a “better conditions” clause stating: “Nothing in
this Agreement shall prevent any individual from negotiating and obtaining from the Producer better conditions
and terms of employment than those herein provided.” Agreement, Producer and International Alliances of the
Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Technicians, Artists, and Allied Crafts of the United States, its
Territories and Canada-Studio Electrical Lighting Technicians Local #728, Aug. 1, 2015.
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taking advantage of the group leverage of the union in collective bargaining. The union’s role
is to reconcile these different interests and to maximize their members’ interests.
A central condition of the majority of above-the-line workers’ work lives is their
nearly total lack of job security. In a traditional collective bargaining setting, such as at an
auto or a steel plant, as workers build seniority, they enhance their job security. In the
entertainment industry, a writer in film or television has no guarantee of work beyond his or
her current project and no guarantee of recognition even for work performed.69 A Writer’s
Guild member may only work once, but his or her work may generate profits for decades to
come. Hence, the traditional demand for residuals for writers based on the popularity and
redistribution of their work over many years has now morphed into concern about the advent
of streaming services and redistribution of Guild members’ work on the internet.70
Collective bargaining with employees who work on or support stage productions has
similarities to, but also important differences with, their counterparts employed in Hollywood.
IATSE also represents most below-the-line workers on Broadway shows, including
technicians and stage workers. IATSE negotiates collective bargaining agreements
comparable to those for other hourly employees; the agreements cover group issues such as
working conditions, hourly wages, health care insurance, and other benefits. In contrast to
Hollywood, individually bargained compensation is not generally added onto the collectively
bargained floor.
However, the situation is different for above-the-line workers engaged in other
creative functions. Actors’ Equity (AE) represents stage actors. AE is similar to the Screen
Actors Guild and bargains on behalf of stage actors for salary and other benefits when
performing in shows.71 Although some stage actors have expressed frustration with the
requirement that they receive permission from AE before making live performance
commitments, even for charity, the association has been largely beneficial in establishing base
pay for stage performers while still allowing them the freedom to negotiate individually for
higher pay.72 Unfortunately, for all but the most famous actors and absent residuals and other
downstream compensation, leverage is limited and few are compensated above scale.73
The situation is worse for the other above-the-line workers. Broadway playwrights
do not have a union such as the WGA. They are classified as independent contractors under
agency law and negotiate with producers individually.74 Unlike screenwriters, playwrights
retain the copyright to their work and have the freedom to grant a producer a specifically
69

Wellman v. Writers Guild Am., W., Inc., 146 F.3d 666, 667 (9th Cir. 1998).
John Patrick Pullen, 5 Reasons Streaming is Making DVDs Extinct, TIME (June 15, 2015, 8:37 AM),
https://time.com/3921019/streaming-dvds/.
71
The Supreme Court, in reviewing Actors’ Equity’s role in regulating theatrical agents, described its work as
follows: “Equity is a national union that has represented stage actors and actresses since early in this century. .
. . [I]t has collective bargaining agreements with virtually all major theatrical producers in New York City, on
and off Broadway, and with most other theatrical producers throughout the United States. The terms negotiated
with producers are the minimum conditions of employment (called ‘scale’); an actor or actress is free to
negotiate wages or terms more favorable than the collectively bargained minima.” H. A. Artists & Assocs., Inc.
v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704, 706–07 (1981).
72
See generally Jeff Linamen, Negotiating the Entertainment Industry Contract, THEATRE FROM THE CTR.
AISLE, (Feb. 21, 2011), http://theatrecenteraisle.blogspot.com/2011/02/i-hope-i-get-it.html.
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Id.
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Ashley Kelly, Bargaining Power on Broadway: Why Congress Should Pass the Playwrights Licensing
Antitrust Initiative Act in the Era of Hollywood on Broadway, 16 J. L. & POL’Y 877, 880 (2008).
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tailored package of performance rights for a set time while retaining all other rights.
However, beyond the ability to retain copyrights, playwrights have little leverage in
individual negotiations with producers. The same is true of Broadway directors who, like
playwrights—but unlike the Hollywood directors the Directors Guild represents—also have
no collective bargaining rights. Not surprisingly, the associations representing the interests of
both groups have sought legislative exemption from antitrust laws to allow these
organizations to bargain collectively and function as actual unions.75
Although troubling inequities remain, the multitier bargaining frameworks in the
sports and entertainment industries afford basic benefits and protections secured by collective
bargaining agreements and individual contracts. This hybrid model combines the advantages
of the flexibility and entrepreneurship of the independent contractor with the economic and
legal protections of employee status. Unquestionably, this arrangement works to the
advantage of superstar players and entertainment personalities, but it also provides basic
benefits and protections for those lower down the ladder. The upper tier pulls up the bottom
tier as a result of its greater leverage. Internal disagreements about the balance of equities
within these groups still exist, but the stars and the industries are doing well enough that such
stresses seem manageable.76
In the sports and entertainment industries, agents have developed the expertise to
effectively negotiate individual contracts as part of a collectively bargained framework for
negotiation. That approach may be less viable when workers without unique skills need
representation and where there is a large supply of labor to meet demand. Yet, an entity that
negotiates the basic security terms, such as a union, could also authorize agents to negotiate
specific provisions for the short-duration gig workers, particularly if there is a pressing, time
sensitive need for their labor. If the worker has enough individual bargaining power, he or she
may be able to negotiate specialized pension, health care, and other benefits that are beyond
the basic agreement. Thus, in exchange for providing skilled workers an organization of
greater and lesser skilled workers could require that the employer provide benefits and
compensation which meet certain basic standards. At the very least, such an entity could
certify that the employers meet specified workplace standards.
Further, the negotiating entity may be able to use the leverage it has with employers
in representing workers with greater expertise or experience to provide a floor of benefits and
protections to less skilled workers. In a period of high demand for labor, entities that provide
labor have the leverage to obtain benefits for lesser skilled workers because they are a source
of needed labor and because they establish an ongoing connection between qualified workers
and the enterprise. This has some similarity to the way hiring halls work in the construction
industry.

75

Congress has never voted on any of these proposals and, as a result, the Dramatists Guild, the professional
association of playwrights, is largely powerless to protect its members’ economic interests. Id. at 898.
76
Ongoing tension exists in Major League Baseball between the young players, who under the collective
bargaining agreement must wait to benefit from free agency, and the older players, who believe they are being
pushed out of the league in favor of the less costly young players. Tyler Kepner, M.L.B. and Players’ Union Set
to Begin Early Labor Talks, N.Y. TIMES, (June 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/17/sports/mlblabor-talks.html.
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IV. A PATH FORWARD (THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE)
On August 12, 2020, a California state court granted a demand for an injunction
compelling compliance with AB-5 by Uber, Lyft, and other rideshare operators, and ruled that
the drivers who used the App based platforms supplied by the companies to be employees,
rather than independent contractors, under the statute.77 In issuing the injunction the court
made the following observation:
Far from “merely incidental” to Defendants’ transportation network
businesses, drivers’ work—the work of transporting customers for
compensation—is an “integral part” of those businesses. [citation omitted]
Defendants’ entire business is that of transporting passengers for
compensation. Unlike an independent plumber or electrician who may visit
a retail store on one occasion to perform a single, limited task such as
repairing a leak or installing a new electrical line, Defendant’s drivers are
part of their usual, everyday business operations, and their work falls
squarely within the ordinary course of that business. [Footnote omitted]78
The same day the injunction was granted, Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi published
an op-ed in which he acknowledged that the current gig employment model is inadequate.
Khosrowshahi advocated a “third way” between employee and independent status in which,
“gig economy companies be required to establish benefits funds which… workers… can use
for the benefits they want, like health insurance or paid time off… All gig companies would
be required to participate, so that workers can build up benefits even if they switch between
apps.”79
He also stated his support for providing gig workers with protection against
employment discrimination as well as medical and disability coverage, but his proposal did
not include coverage under state workers compensation and minimum wage laws or provide
an opportunity for third party representation. 80 The “third way” described in the op-ed
mirrored Proposition 22, the resolution sponsored by Uber and Lyft to exempt their
operations from AB-5, which was ultimately passed decisively by California voters in the
November 2020 election. 81
Proposition 22 carves out an exemption from California employment and
transportation law to permit ride sharing services such as Uber and Lyft to continue
classifying workers as independent contractors.82 While Proposition 22 allows for these
workers to be classified as independent contractors, the platforms that employ them are now
required to provide them with certain protections. It requires that they be paid an hourly wage
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Uber Technologies, Inc., 2020 WL 5440308, at *18.
Id. at *14 (citation and footnote omitted).
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for time spent driving equal to 120% of either a local or statewide minimum wage.83
Additionally, firms sponsoring the platforms are required to provide drivers with a stipend for
health insurance if they drive at least fifteen hours per week- an amount that will rise if the
driving time is as high as 25 hours per week, although the full stipend is available only to
drivers working close to full time, and work hours only include the time spent driving to,
picking up, and carrying riders, not waiting time between trips.84 Finally, the proposition
requires that disability and death benefits coverage for on the job death or injury be made
“available” to drivers.85 However, as signaled in Khosrowshahi’s opinion piece, the drivers
are excluded from social security, unemployment insurance, coverage under California
workers compensation law, and California labor standards laws. This despite Khosrowshahi’s
desire as part of his “third way” to “…improve the voice of the workers”, collective
bargaining is not contemplated. Thus, while Proposition 22 requires certain benefits and
protections be provided to rideshare drivers, the suite of benefits and protections is still quite
weak, and substantially less than what the drivers would be entitled to if they were classified
as employees under AB-5.86 In fact, opponents of Proposition 22 are quite vociferous in
denouncing its self-interested motivation for upending state law.87
Given their history of activism, it is unlikely that drivers will accept even the limited
promises of Proposition 22 on blind faith. The need to make sure these protections and
benefits are actually made available may encourage the drivers to continue to coordinate even
if they cannot unionize, and once this happens, they may also seek to add on to the suite of
benefits. Moreover, the terms of the proposition provide no guidance on procedures for
resolution of disputes over the benefits and pay guarantees it requires. Drivers may want to
audit how the rideshare companies’ contributions to pay for the benefits mandated by
Proposition 22 are calculated and administered or even to participate in the administration.
Will a state agency handle such matters, will the driver(s) have to bring a lawsuit, will there
be a system of private arbitration, or will the rideshare companies take the position that they
have exclusive authority over administration of the rights and benefits provided by the
proposition? It would make sense for drivers to try to organize in some way to assure they
have a voice concerning such matters. Despite the passage of Proposition 22 and the barriers
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it places to organizing App based drivers, it is also the case that Proposition 22’s obstacles
may incentivize drivers to pursue more effective collective activity. 88
Of course, the composition and dispositions of the individual drivers are quite
diverse. Some are long-term dedicated drivers and others are part timers with other jobs and
other career goals, so their inclinations towards collective activities as a group will inevitably
vary. But, as with other gig workers in the newer high tech or “disruptive” industries,
collective activity is a growing phenomenon and can be expected.
Collective action by Google, Uber and other gig workers has been shown to be an
alternative approach towards achieving economic and political ends. It avoids the legal
structure’s current ambiguity and obstacles, Thus, notwithstanding the vote on Proposition 22
and the present classification of App based drivers as independent contractors by the NLRB,
it is not hard to envision the development of a system of group or individual dealing with
respect to scheduling and setting fares, and collective organization to handle working
conditions and long-term benefits for App based drivers.89 There is no question that this sort
of informal system is not as comprehensive or effective as the formal NLRA based individual
and collective bargaining format in sports and entertainment, but it may trigger collective
action.
Informal organizing among gig workers is already taking hold. Workers have pooled
together to gain access to benefits that remain elusive due to their nonemployee status. The
Freelancers Union, with 350,000 members, offers various health care and retirement options
to those without employer-based plans.90 The organization’s website points to its broad
mission: “Independents. United.”91
Like the Freelancers Union, the National Guestworker Alliance’s Indy Worker
Guild seeks to exert economic and political power through a collective of diverse workers.
Drawing inspiration from the guild structure of the Middle Ages, the Guild aims to transform
outdated labor policies based on the notion of work as one lifelong position in order to better
reflect the reality of today’s fluctuating and diverse jobs.92 The Guild envisions working
relationships where security and flexibility coexist: “Whether we get gigs from apps, from
personal networks, or from temp agencies we all deserve to have a safety net when we need
it—and we don’t have one now. We are joining together to demand that our work be
recognized and rewarded by policy makers and the companies making money from our
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work.”93 The organization’s articulated primary aims include access to benefits, the right to
collectively bargain, financial security, and freedom from bias.94
Nonetheless, the post-Proposition 22 environment has not inspired or generated
acceptance of the above sort of informal organizing among drivers. In late 2020 both Uber
and Lyft released their plans for benefits for drivers under Proposition 22. Uber offered a
benefits program which calls for drivers to be paid at least 20 percent more that the city’s
pickup minimum wage plus 30 cents per mile for expenses. Drivers who earn less than the
guaranteed minimum over a two-week period will be paid the difference automatically.95
Lyft claims it provides a quarterly health care subsidy for drivers who work an
average of at least 15 hours per week, an important benefit for workers. In order to qualify for
this benefit drivers will have to prove they are enrolled in a qualified healthcare plan.96 Uber’s
healthcare stipend also requires an average of 15 hours per week, and drivers must prove they
are the primary policyholder on a qualifying health insurance plan. Uber drivers are supposed
to receive 50 percent of the stipend if they average 15 active hours a week and 100 percent of
the stipend when they average 25 active hours per week.97 These benefits purportedly became
available in January of 2021, although there does not appear to be an administrative or
enforcement mechanism established by the companies or the state for checking whether this
has actually happened or to assist drivers in accessing these benefits.
Predictably, problems have been noted accessing the benefits. For example, many
gig workers have been unable to receive the health insurance stipend because they are either
uninsured or get insurance through Medi-Cal and the stipend is only available to those who
have insurance through Covered California, the state health exchange program.98 Gig workers
who were unable to qualify for the stipend assert that the advertisements for Proposition 22
were misleading.99 This has led to more protests outside of Uber headquarters, with workers
demanding to receive more rights and benefits.100 One gig worker said “[d]uring the Prop. 22
campaign, they said if you’re working a minimum of 25 hours that they were going to give
[the stipend]…They didn’t say it only applies to this or that.”101 A second worker said “[w]e
are here today because we want our health care…They said we’d get health care, but they
don’t give us anything.”102
There does not appear to be any sort of appeal or complaint process to resolve such
issues, nor is there any indication that workers have organized either informally or through
established unions to address them, perhaps because, after having fought Proposition 22 tooth
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and nail, unions and other entities representing gig workers do not want to lend credibility to
the new law.
Significantly, the battle over the legality of Proposition 22 has also not been
resolved as gig workers, with the support of unions such as the SEIU, have brought suit
against both the State of California and the rideshare companies, claiming that the law is
unconstitutional. After the California Supreme Court refused to allow the parties challenging
the law to bypass the lower courts, the Superior Court of California in Alameda County ruled
that Proposition 22 was in fact, unconstitutional.103 The Court held:
A prohibition on legislation authorizing collective bargaining by app-based
drivers does not promote the right to work as an independent contractor,
nor does it protect work flexibility, nor does it provide minimum
workplace safety and pay standards for those workers. It appears only to
protect the economic interests of the network companies in having a
divided, non- unionized workforce, which is not a stated goal of the
legislation…
…The Court finds that Section 7451 is unconstitutional because it limits
the power of a future legislature to define app-based drivers as workers
subject to workers’ compensation law.
The Court finds that Section 7465, subdivision (c)(4) is unconstitutional
because it defies unrelated legislation as an “amendment” and is not
germane to Proposition 22’s state “theme, purpose, or subject.104
The status of the law is unclear after this ruling, although, the rideshare companies
have made clear that they intend to appeal.105
Other states have proposed legislation to provide limited employment rights to gig
workers However, many such workers and the union officials supporting them say that the
proposals do not provide gig workers with the full rights they deserve.106 In New York, there
have been legislative proposals which would create a path for gig workers to unionize and
collectively bargain, but stops short of defining them as employees and entitling them to
employee protections such as minimum wage and anti-discrimination laws.107 Organizations
representing gig workers have been unwilling to support this approach which they believe
makes them “second class” employees. The co-founder of the New York Taxi Workers
Alliance, a union representing 15,000 taxi drivers, said of the proposed New York legislation
“There’s so much wrong with this legislation. What it fundamentally does is relegate drivers
to be second class on every level of labor law, from wages to safety to bargaining rights. In

103

Castellanos v. State, No. RG21088725, 2021 WL 3730951, at *5 (Cal. Super. Aug. 20, 2021).
Id.
105
Conger, supra note 29.
106
Steven Greenhouse, Unionized But Impotent? Row Erupts Over Gig Workers’ Labor Proposal, GUARDIAN
(May 27, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/may/27/gig-workers-unionized-butimpotent-new-york-bill.
107
Id.
104

47
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

21

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2022, Iss. 2 [], Art. 6

THE JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
fact, on wages and unemployment, it rolls back rights that we’ve painfully won.”108 The
controversy over this legislation illustrates the difficulty in fashioning a compromise which
attempts to provide employee protections but acknowledges the need for flexibility of firms
which rely on the services of gig workers.
Thus, the absence of bright line definitions of “employees” and “independent
contractors” has led to a hodgepodge of understandings in difference states and agencies. It
has resulted in unpredictability for businesses and ad hoc efforts by activists to secure gig
workers’ rights and benefits. A clear definition which balances the varying interests of gig
workers and businesses could help both.
V.

THE HYBRID MODEL

The sports and entertainment industries, though riddled with their own
controversies, are a potential model for worker advancement in the gig economy and the
broader economy. The mix of group and individual deal making in these industries shows
how a flexible system of worker representation can be effective in today’s economy.
Moreover, professional associations—representing pilots, engineers, and other highly skilled
workers—have used the professional pride of their members to expand their traditional role to
improve member benefits and compensation.109 Finally, new organizations that provide labor
to the market, such as domestic workers and home health care workers, similar to
construction union hiring halls or the new managed service providers, may also demand
benefits and protections in exchange for the qualified workers they provide, such as health
care, pensions and overtime pay. Yet these organizations cannot act as effective middlemen
unless they provide value to both employees and companies, because the internet enables
direct dealing between workers and firms.
The established rights and safety net guaranteed by law to “employees” are less
effective when unions represent only 6% of private-sector workers because individual
employees are less able to enforce or take advantage of those rights. Historically, labor law
envisioned that organized employees would enhance their standard of living and security
through union organization. It was generally the case when a substantial part of an industry
was organized by a union that these enhancements would be mimicked by nonunion
companies to stay competitive in recruiting labor or to avoid unionization themselves.
Clearly, this paradigm is no longer the reality.
Similarly, the traditional expectation for unorganized employees was that a safety
net of rights and support would be available. Yet for independent contractors, this safety net
barely exists. When these protective laws, such as the NLRA, ERISA, workers compensation,
unemployment insurance were passed, the percentage of workers who were independent
contractors was minimal so coverage of these laws, which expressed a societal interest, were
not extended to non “employees.”
Labor law needs to provide a flexible structure to permit the most options for
employee organization, safety net protections and corporate competitiveness. The
intermediary entities—be they agents, hiring halls, MSPs, or associations—all have a place in
108
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this new order. The dividing line between illegal employer domination of unions and new
forms of effective employee groupings should be reexamined, especially in light of the
explosion of information and worldwide opportunities to sell one’s labor on the internet.110 At
the same time, currently, these new types of intermediaries or employee groupings have
limited chance to provide real value to workers who are not considered employees. Indeed,
concerted activity on behalf of independent contractors risks exposure under antitrust laws.
Hence, the contradiction which developed over the last few years between federal agency
rulings and policies providing greater latitude for businesses to establish and preserve
independent-contractor status and new state policies favoring or presuming employee status
needs to be resolved on a basis that narrows the opportunity to circumvent employer
obligations.
The sharp divisions between union and nonunion that are the foundation of much of
the nation’s labor law are less relevant to the current state of American business. Such a zerosum approach denies workers needed protections, because neither the right to union
representation nor public policy are today providing for the basic needs of most workers. New
structures are warranted to secure and advance American workers’ interests, which are
increasingly unprotected. Experience shows that reliance on less formal nonunion
intermediaries often leads to union representation, but the more important issue is that
informal representation through intermediaries accepted as legitimate by employees may be
all that is possible in the churn of the gig economy. If such representation adds value to these
workers, it should be preserved.111
All these approaches to advancing workers’ interests need to be explored and
developed. Meeting the challenges of rapidly advancing global, technical, and automated
economies will require a workforce that is treated fairly and not exploited. That workforce, in
turn, needs corporate competitiveness to survive. Effective relationships will determine the
success of the U.S. economy and ensure that its benefits are shared and enjoyed by all
workers. The administration of President Joe Biden is likely to be enmeshed in the
advancement of this issue.112
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VI. CONCLUSION
There is a large and growing body of American workers who engage in individual
project-based work but cannot be defined as entrepreneurs in any true sense. Their escalating
numbers will no doubt endow them with political clout. These workers are likely to push for
access to basic employment benefits such as set wage rates, healthcare, and properly invested
pension savings to help prevent them from becoming an economic underclass. Should such
an underclass emerge it could become a serious societal dilemma as tens of millions of
workers could lose the security of retirement and healthcare benefits as well as the other
statutory protections employees now enjoy. Labor policies which limit the number of workers
who fall into this vulnerable grouping, but also enhance the benefits available to those that do,
are in their interest, but also in the interest of the overall economy and society. There is now
new potential for a fairer and more realistic application of employment status. Equally
important, there is an emerging consensus that the welfare of “gig” or project-based workers
requires protection and that formats for individual and group dealing to assure reasonable
working conditions and a minimal level of benefits for this vulnerable group of workers must
be established. Such an approach could build on the successful models of the sports and
entertainment industries which have balanced the concerns of employers for labor costs with
the movement towards contract work and the need for a safety net for workers.

at a fast-food restaurant is not technically an employee of the fast-food corporation but rather of the franchisee
who owns the specific restaurant. Id. The “joint employer”, in certain cases, would define the corporation as a
joint employer allowing the employee to pursue litigation against it. Id. Likewise, one would expect the
dividing line between independent contractor and employee status to be re-examined, which may well result in
workers like Uber drivers being reclassified as employees under federal labor. Id.
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